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This article considers certain histo-
riographical aspects of the Vilnius issue as 
an international problem. The author analy-
ses the origins of the Polish-Lithuanian con-
flict, the role of the struggle for Vilnius in 
the general context of the Polish-Lithuanian 
confrontation, and the origin and nature of 
Lithuanian nationalism. The article also ex-
amines historiographical perspectives on 
the seizure of Vilnius by the troops of the 
Polish general, L. Żeligowsky, and the in-
ternational consequences of the violation of 
the Suwałki Agreement. The author pays 
special attention to the positions of western 
powers, the decision of the Conference of 
Ambassadors on March 15, 1923, and the 
mediation of the League of Nations in the 
territorial dispute between Lithuania and 
Poland. The article considers the existing 
historiographical concepts and evaluations 
of the role of the Soviet diplomacy in the 
Vilnius issue. The author identifies new 
trends in the contemporary historiography 
of the Vilnius problem. 
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The Vilnius issue as an interna-
tional problem was not only the stum-
bling block in the bilateral Polish-
Lithuanian relations of the interbellum, 
but also involved the leading European 
powers and the Soviet Union into the 
tangle of contradictions. 
The Vilnius issue is an interna-
tional problem that resulted from the 
conflict between Poland and Lithuania 
over the ancient city of Wilno and the 
contiguous territories. After the seizure 
of the city by the Polish troops on Oc-
tober 9, 1920, Lithuania and Poland 
were at war until 1927. Diplomatic re-
lations between the countries were re-
sumed only in 1938. Throughout the 
interbellum, the Vilnius issue was the 
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key problem of Lithuanian foreign policy, which the ideologists of Lithua-
nian nationalism were especially sensitive to, whereas the Constitution of 
independent Lithuania proclaimed Vilnius the occupied capital of the state. 
The dispute between Lithuania and Poland is compared by researchers to 
other conflicts of the kind. The American historian, A. E. Senn, draws an 
analogy with the Arab-Israeli and Indo-Pakistani conflicts, emphasising the 
specific feature of the Polish-Lithuanian confrontation: the disputed region 
included the capital of one of the rivalling countries [1, p. 235]. The Lithua-
nian author, V. Žalys, when stressing the significance of Vilnius for the in-
terwar Lithuania, draws a parallel with Alsace and Lorrain for France, as 
well as Trieste for Italy. He emphasises that, however dear these territories 
were to Italian hearts, they had never been the cradles of either French or 
Italian statehood [2, p. 24]. 
Having become the central problem of Lithuanian-Polish relations, the 
Vilnius issue attracted the attention of contemporary scholars [3—9] even 
when the final resolution seemed to be a matter of a distant future. The Pol-
ish-Lithuanian conflict has been the focus of attention of international histo-
rians. Several works on the historiography of the problem have been pub-
lished over the last ten years; however, they present either a cross-section of 
opinions of historians of a certain chronological period (a review of studies 
published after 1989) [10—12], or a general systematisation of the accumu-
lated historical research [13]. 
This article makes an attempt to draw attention to certain problems of the 
historiography of the Vilnius issue as an international problem and abstract 
from the chronological and traditionally national principle of the analysis of 
historians’ perspectives on the problem. The views of researchers are 
grouped according to the four key aspects of the topic: 1) the sources and 
causes of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, its features; 2) the meaning and in-
ternational consequences of the action of the Polish general, L. Żeligowsky1; 
3) the position of western powers and the cooperation of international insti-
tutions; 4) the position of the USSR on the Vilnius issue. 
The main body of sources reflecting the vicissitudes of the diplomatic 
struggle for Vilnius was published as early as the interbellum. However, the 
same documents were differently interpreted by historians; interpretations 
were often affected by political beliefs and nationality. The modern (post-
Soviet) period of historiography is characterised by a wide use of archive 
materials that were earlier inaccessible or overlooked by the previous gen-
erations of scholars. Unfortunately the works of modern Russian historians 
are at a considerable disadvantage in comparison to the publications of west-
ern counterparts in terms of the sources used. 
According to certain historians, the local Vilnius conflict was just a part 
of the global Polish-Lithuanian confrontation dating back to the second half 
of the 19th century. Before the restoration of independent Poland and Lithua-
nia, the problem of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict was scrutinised in an arti-
cle by M. Römeris [14]. The famous Lithuanian lawyer and public figure an-
                                                     
1 I.e. the seizure of Vilnius by the Polish military on October 9, 1920. 
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alysed the gradual process of the Polonisation and Russification of the popu-
lation residing in the territories of Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL). The 
Lithuanian nobility was most affected by Polonisation. M. Römeris believes 
that it led to the Lithuanian national culture being preserved in the lowest 
peasant circles [14, p. 247]. The people, excluded from political life and in-
volved in land cultivation, did not have close contacts with the educated lay-
ers and were hardly affected by the high-society culture, which, after the uni-
fication of Poland and Lithuania, and later the inclusion into the Russian 
Empire, was dominated by the Polish and Russian languages. The Lithua-
nian nobility, overpowered by Polish and Russian cultural influence, 
“merged” with it. Thus, the first leaders of the Lithuanian national move-
ment, which emerged at the turn of the 18th century, were of peasant origin. 
This idea was developed — from a peculiar point of view — by the 
Soviet and Russian authors, R. Žepkaitė, R. Žiugžda, I. V. Mikhutina, 
Ya. Ya. Grishin [15—19]. R. Žepkaitė explained the hostility between town 
nations by class antagonism between Lithuanian serfs and land-owners, 
most of whom were of the Polish origin [16, p. 17]. The Russian historian 
Ya. Ya. Grishin agrees with I. V. Mikhutina supporting the idea that the 
Lithuanian nation predominantly developed as a nation of peasants, and 
such a differentiation in the national structure contributed to the Polish cul-
tural influence having exerted at the expense of the Lithuanian national 
culture. Thus, the national movement proclaimed itself right from the start 
as anti-Polish [18, p. 16]. 
An opposite interpretation of anti-Polish sentiments of the Lithuanian na-
tional movement was given by the Polish expert, W. Wielhorski. He as-
sumed that Polonisation was a result of a conscious decision of the Lithua-
nian population (not only the nobility, but also bourgeoisie, and peasantry) 
for a more progressive Polish culture [20, p. 254]. 
When speaking of the development of the Lithuanian national move-
ment, it is important to emphasise that its initial target was only the enlight-
enment of Lithuanians. However, from the second half of the 19th century, 
the achievement of political independence appeared on the agenda [21]. It 
was the time, when, according to M. Römeris, the global misunderstanding 
between the Polish and Lithuanians arose [14, p. 248]. The Lithuanian dip-
lomat and lawyer, D. Zaunius, stresses that the efforts of the Lithuanian peo-
ple to create an independent state were deemed by the nationals of restored 
Poland to be an insult, especially when Lithuania decided to unite around the 
Lithuanian capital of Vilnius, to which the Polish had developed a certain 
liking [22, p. 31]. 
Another contentious issue is the problem of the national identity of the 
population of the disputed territories. Historians offer statistical data of cen-
suses; however, they admit that one of the reasons behind the conflict was 
the different interpretation of the notion of nationality by the Polish and 
Lithuanians. The Polish author, P. Łossowski, writes that, according to the 
criteria applied by Polish politicians, a Polish national was a resident of the 
GDL who spoke Polish at home and “what is more important, felt that they 
are Polish, identified themselves as a Polish national”, whereas Lithuanian, 
International history 
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he continues, “maintained that nationality is determined by the origin, how-
ever ancient, and self-identification is of secondary importance. The Polish 
and Belarusian population of the disputed lands was considered Slavicised 
Lithuanians who must be returned to the bosom of “Lithuanity” [23, p. 14]. 
Another Polish specialist, K. Bukhowski, scrutinises the problem of 
Lithuanian national and historical identity. He draws attention to the attitude 
of Lithuanian national ideologists to the so called “polonised Lithuani-
ans” — the Polish residing in the territories of the GDL [24, p. 9]. A “polo-
nised Lithuanian” is a label which was actively used by the activists of the 
Lithuanian national movement. Lithuanian nationalists had a similar view on 
the Germanised population of the so called Lithuanian Minor, which was a 
part of Eastern Prussia [24, p. 11]. This interpretation of the notion of na-
tionality, according to P. Łossowski, gave grounds for Lithuanian territorial 
claims [23, p. 15]. The author of a fundamental work entitled The Struggle 
for Lithuanian Independence, Antanas Rukša, calls those claims “a little bit 
divorced from reality” [25, p. 67]. 
Both authors, P. Łossowski and K. Buchowski, agree that the Lithuanian 
national revival and later the ideology of an independent Lithuania devel-
oped in the fear of assimilation [25, p. 14]. The national ideology was called 
to stop the processes of biological demise of “Lithuanity” [24, p. 9]. 
Lithuanian nationalism rested on the glory of the GDL with the capital in 
Vilnius2 was, according to A. E. Senn, the heart of Vilnius issue. At the time, 
to abandon Vilnius meant to renounce the idea of independence [1, p. 235]. 
V. Žalys agrees with his transatlantic counterpart, “After the annexation of 
Vilnius, Poland was perceived in Lithuania as a major threat to the sover-
eignly and territorial unity of the country” [2, p. 24]. Thus, for years, the 
Vilnius issue was the central problem of not only foreign, but also internal 
policy of Lithuania3. 
A different perspective on the reasons behind the Polish-Lithuanian 
conflict is presented in the works of some Soviet and Russian scholars — 
J. Matulaitis, I. Shubina, R. Žepkaitė, Ya. Grishin. They emphasise the 
“greed and aggression” of the restored Polish state [18, p. 11], which 
I. Shubin described quite emotionally, “in effect, the argument from the 
population, which was put forward by Poland, had the same effect as the 
motivation of a wolf that devoured an innocent lamb because it was hun-
gry” [4, p. 27]. Ya. Grishin emphasises that Poland was highly interested in 
the Neman basin and the warm water port of Klaipeda, which would “have 
granted Poland free access to the Baltic Sea and created a convenient base 
for the seizure of the whole Baltic area” [18, p. 35—36]. The problem of 
Polonisation of Lithuanians was also paid attention to: J. Matulaits focuses 
on the activities of Polish scholars of the interbellum who developed the 
idea of historical predetermination of Slavicisation of Lithuanians residing 
                                                     
2 The syndrome of GDL heritage was also addressed by other Lithuanian historians. 
See [2, p. 17]. 
3 For more details on the attitude of different Lithuanian political parties to the Vil-
nius issue see [26]. 
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in the Wilno and Kowno provinces, as well as the Germanisation of Prus-
sian Lithuanians [3, p. 8]. 
Historians agree that the climax, the “point of no return” of Polish-
Lithuanian relations was the violation of the Suwałki Agreement4 by Poland 
and the seizure of Vilnius by the troops of General L. Żeligowsky5. The fact 
that the general’s “riot” was supported by the authorities of the Second Pol-
ish Republic raises no doubts in the academic community. G. Rauch writes 
that it was obvious that Warsaw approved of this risky undertaking [27, 
p. 101]. On the basis of Polish archive materials; R. Žepkaitė comes to a 
conclusion that, alongside J. Piłsudski, the Polish Foreign Minister I. Pad-
erewski also knew about the imminent “riot” [16, p. 22]. The Polish author 
Zb. K. Cesarz also maintains that the attack was planned and implemented at 
the command of the government of the Second Republic of Poland [28, 
p. 173]. He criticises the actions of the Polish leadership, first of all, because 
they damaged the international image of the country which since then was 
deemed by the international community to be an aggressor and a violator of 
international agreements [28, p. 174]. The conclusion of the Suwałki 
Agreement is considered by P. Łossowski a strategic mistake of the govern-
ment of the Second Polish Republic whose leadership lacked the resolution 
to avoid signing the document [23, p. 225]. 
However, the seizure of Vilnius inflicted irreversible damage not only to 
Polish-Lithuanian bilateral relations. According to V. Žalys, it was that inci-
dent that buried any hope for consolidation in the region [2, p. 21]. The 
American researcher P. Čepėnas draws attention to the fact that the Vilnius 
issue deteriorated significantly the relations between the allies — England 
and France [29, p. 624]. 
The position of western powers on the Vilnius issue is differently evalu-
ated by researchers. Some believe that the Western approach was, to a de-
gree, a reflection of the general attitude towards Lithuania. The presence of a 
representative of an independent Lithuania at the Paris peace conference was 
a surprise for great powers because Lithuania had not been invited to the 
meeting6. In the fact that the West perceived Lithuania just as a Polish prov-
ince, P. Čepėnas sees a result of Polish propaganda. In his research, he ar-
gues that, despite financial complications, representatives of the Lithuanian 
delegation published 15—20 items of informative materials about Lithuania 
in order to influence the European public opinion [29, p. 462—463]. 
Calling the Vilnius issue an effective example of the allies’ influence in 
Eastern Europe, A. E. Senn stresses that the reason of their failure lies, to a 
                                                     
4 The Suwałki Agreement between Lithuania and Poland was signed in the town of 
Suwałki on October 7, 1920 through the mediation of the League of Nations Control 
Commission. According to the provisions of the agreement, Vilnius and contiguous 
lands remained a part of Lithuania.  
5 The 9th of October (the day of the Seizure of Vilnius by Polish troops) was recog-
nised as a national day of mourning throughout the interbellum. 
6 For more details on the actions of the Lithuanians in Paris see: [30]. 
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great degree, in the insufficient understanding of the features of the Eastern 
European nationalism. Thus, the “idealistic plans” for plebiscite, federation, 
and autonomy, were shattered into pieces; and by the end of 1922, the allies 
were ready to acknowledge the status quo [1, p. 26]. It was this period that 
marked the beginning of acknowledgement of Lithuanian sovereignty by west-
ern countries, when it became obvious that it was impossible to unite Poland and 
Lithuania into a federation7. On March 15, 1923, the Conference of Ambassa-
dors of the Entente adopted a resolution, according to which Vilnius and the 
contiguous territories became a part the Republic of Poland. 
This step taken by the West, which, according to A. Senn, was somewhat of 
an act of desperation [1, p. 26], was considered by the Soviet historians as an 
exertion of the will of imperial states [32, p. 84—85]. In the context of the 
decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, G. Rauch develops the idea 
about a peculiar compensation for Lithuania from the West in connection to 
the Klaipeda issue8. 
Great powers hoped that, if the Lithuanian government was allowed to 
keep this region, it would easier put up with the loss of Vilnius [27, p. 105]. 
According to P. Miškinis, K. Počs, A. Rubtsov, R. Žiugžda, for the West 
Lithuania was an important link in the chain of states composing the “sani-
tary cordon” against the USSR [17; 34—36]. 
As to the European participation in the Vilnius issue, it is worth noting the 
historical research dedicated to the mediation of the League of Nations in the 
Polish-Lithuanian dispute [28; 37]. It was this international institution that be-
came a platform for the Polish-Lithuanian confrontation throughout the 
1920s. 
In the Soviet rhetoric, the League of Nations was presented as a herald of 
the will of imperialistic states, which even “sanctioned the seizure of Wilno 
by imperialistic Poland” [3, p. 10]. However, the works of Zb. K. Cesarz and 
G. Vilkelis make an attempt to show the ambiguity of the actions of the in-
ternational organization in the context of the Vilnius issue. 
According to the data offered by Zb. K. Cesarz, as early as October 
1920, Poland aspired to avoid the mediation of the League of Nations, es-
pecially the latter’s initiatives on holding a plebiscite in the Vilnius region 
[28, p. 186]. When analysing the events of the autumn of 1920, G. Vilkelis 
states that the League of Nations was not able to keep the Polish at bay and 
chose the path of growing compromises and concessions [37, p. 227]. The 
attempts of the League of Nations to ensure peace in the region failed, 
                                                     
7 For more details on the international recognition of Lithuania see: [31]. 
8 After World War I, Klaipeda (the Memel region) was detached from Germany and 
made a protectorate of the Entente States. At first, it was planned to transfer the city 
to the “Polish-Lithuanian Federation”. As a result of an armed provocation organ-
ised by the Committee for the Salvation of Lithuanian Minors in January 1923, Me-
mel was seized by Lithuanian troops. After the initial protests of the Conference of 
Ambassadors of the Entente, allies made a decision to transfer the Memel region to 
Lithuania; this decision was approved by the Council of the League of Nations [33, 
p. 31—32]. 
M. A. Mankevich 
19 
since they were based on legitimising military aggression. At the same 
time, G. Vilkelis admits that in many cases the position of this interna-
tional institution was determined not by the principles of peace protection, 
but mostly by the interests of great powers. Even if the League of Nations 
had decided, according to Article 16 of its Charter, to restore the situation 
between Lithuania and Poland which existed before the violation of the 
Suwałki Agreement, it is difficult to imagine who would have been able to 
enforce this decision [37, p. 228]. 
The Soviet Union was also involved in the search for solutions to the 
Vilnius issue. The Soviet and later Russian historiography has developed a 
tradition of idealising the actions of the USSR in the Vilnius issue. All re-
searchers stress that the RSFSR played the key role in the return of Vilnius 
to Lithuania in summer 1920 [16, p. 21]. Later, the policy of the Soviet state 
rested on the principles contained in the Moscow Peace Treaty9. The Russian 
author concludes that “almost the whole interbellum was marked by the aspi-
ration of the Soviet Union to establish normal, neighbourly relations with 
Lithuania” [18, p. 9]. Yu. Plotnikov focuses on the Soviet moral support for 
Lithuania [33, p. 17]. 
The major achievements of the USSR in the framework of the “idealis-
tic” concept are as follows: the RSFSR condemned the actions of Poland and 
helped Lithuania prevent the plebiscite in the territory of the Vilnius region 
in autumn 192010; it also condemned the resolution of the Conference of 
Ambassadors of the Entente of March 15, 1923. As the relations between 
Poland and Lithuania became more strained, the USSR helped keep peace in 
the region. Similarly, the Soviet policy is assessed by D. Zaunius, who 
stresses that Russia did not allow Poland pursue the policy of non-participa-
tion in any agreements and became a guarantor of Lithuanian sovereignty 
[22, p. 33]. 
A different perspective on the actions of the USSR within the Vilnius is-
sue is taken by foreign authors. Without denying the above mentioned 
achievements of the Soviet diplomacy, this group of researchers focuses on 
the motives behind the Soviet policy. Special attention is paid to the assess-
ment of the Moscow Peace Treaty. P. Łossowski calls Lithuanian coopera-
tion with the RSFSR and the violation of neutrality in the Soviet-Polish 
war11 a suicide policy for Lithuania, since in case of the victory of the Red 
                                                     
9 The Moscow Peace Treaty was signed by Lithuania and the RSFSR on July 12, 
1920. The Soviet Russia recognised the sovereignty of Lithuania and acknowledged 
Lithuanian authority over the Vilnius region, as well as Grodno, Lida, and Ash-
myany. Both parties undertook to prevent the deployment of the third countries’ 
arms forces in their territory. 
10 The project plebiscite in the disputed territories was proposed to the conflicting 
parties by the League of Nations. Lithuania (as well as Poland) tried to prevent it. 
Firstly, the troops of General Żeligowsky were still deployed in the territory of the 
Vilnius region; secondly, the mere fact of a referendum on the state affiliation of 
their own capital was unacceptable for Lithuanians. 
11 The issue of the nature of Lithuanian neutrality in the Soviet-Polish war is conten-
tious, see [38]. 
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Army over Poland, Lithuania would have faced swift and complete Sovieti-
sation [23, p. 226]. A. Kasparavičius emphasises the contradictions between 
the Moscow and Riga Peace Treaties [39, p. 130]. While in the former Rus-
sia acknowledged Lithuanian authority over the Vilnius region, the peace 
treaty with Poland defined it as the subject of dispute between Lithuania and 
Poland. Č. Laurinavičius also assesses the Moscow Peace Treaty negatively, 
stressing that as a result Lithuania was made a protectorate of the Soviet 
Russia [40, p. 37]. 
On the basis of archive materials, A. Kasparavičius comes to a conclu-
sion that the conflict between Poland and Lithuania was to the Soviet benefit 
[39, p. 129]. The Polish-Lithuanian confrontation hampered the establish-
ment of an Eastern Locarno — a political bloc of the Baltic countries (Lithu-
ania, Latvia, and Estonia) — thus the Soviet diplomacy was highly interested 
not in solving the Lithuanian-Polish conflict, but rather in its existence [39, 
p. 136]. The Soviet Union was a pharmacist that dispensed the conflict de-
pending on the circumstances [39, p. 133]. V. Žalys maintains that the true 
victors in the Polish-Lithuanian conflict were the Soviet Russia and Ger-
many [2, p. 21]. The exclusion of Lithuania from the designed buffer made it 
impossible to surround the strategically important Eastern Prussia [2, p. 22]. 
Both German and Soviet diplomats hinted to Lithuanian politicians on more 
than one occasion that, if Lithuania had acceded the union of the Baltic 
states, it would have been unwise for it to expect any support in the struggle 
for Vilnius against Poland [41]. 
In conclusion, one can say that the interest of both Russian and interna-
tional researchers in the Vilnius issue does not wane even today. Russian, 
Polish, Lithuanian, and American scholars put forward original concepts and 
approaches to different aspects of the Vilnius problem. Over the last year, 
historiography has abandoned emotional and one-sided judgments, as well as 
nationally biased assessment of the participation of the USSR and other Eu-
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